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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, 
v. 
CARLOS REINALDO SAMPSON, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 890327-CA 
Category No. 2 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Two issues are presented in this petition for 
rehearing: 
1. Did this Court overlook pertinent decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court and numerous lower courts in 
concluding that defendant's confession, which was obtained by 
police after defendant had validly waived his rights under 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was rendered 
inadmissible by a prior Miranda violation? 
2. Did this Court overlook pertinent decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court and numerous lower courts in 
suggesting, without analysis, that the victim's body was 
inadmissible because it was discovered as a result of statements 
and acts of defendant that were obtained in violation of Miranda? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies is included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with murder in the second degree, 
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann, § 76-5-203 
(Supp. 1990) (Record [hereinafter R.] at 74-76)- Defendant filed 
a motion to suppress the statements taken from him by the police, 
and that motion was denied on August 28, 1987 (R. 169-91). 
Defendant was tried by jury in the Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable David 
S. Young, district judge, presiding, and was found guilty as 
charged (R. at 253-62). Judge Young sentenced defendant to a 
term in the Utah State Prison of not less than five years and 
which may be for life (R. at 329). 
On appeal, this Court reversed and remanded the case on 
the issue of the suppression of defendant's statements. State v. 
Sampson, No. 890327-CA (Utah Ct. App. Sep. 11, 1990) (a copy of 
the opinion is attached in the Addendum). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A complete statement of the facts is contained in the 
State's responsive brief. The facts pertinent to this petition 
for rehearing are that defendant was given the Miranda warnings 
by Sergeant Syd Elliott at the Salt Lake County Sheriff's office 
before administering a polygraph examination (R. 360 at 337-38). 
When the warnings were given, defendant questioned whether he 
should have a lawyer, but then said he was not really worried (R. 
at 120). Sergeant Elliott then administered the test and 
determined that defendant was being untruthful when he said that 
he did not know where the victim was (R. at 141). 
With the results of the polygraph, Sheriff N. D. 
Hayward questioned defendant about the location of the victim (R. 
360 at 428). Defendant eventually told Sheriff Hayward that his 
child was dead, then took the sheriff and other officers to the 
body (R. 360 at 428-30). While enroute, defendant was not 
questioned but volunteered that he thought that the child had 
died of a respiratory disease (R. 360 at 444). 
After the victim's body was recovered, defendant was 
placed under arrest and returned to the Metropolitan Hall of 
Justice in Salt Lake City (R. 365 at 80-81). At the Hall of 
Justice, Detective Richard Judd gave defendant the Miranda 
warnings and defendant, without hesitation, signed a waiver form 
and agreed to talk with the detectives (R. 361 at 505). 
Detective Judd interrogated defendant, who admitted that he had 
struck the child too hard and caused her death (R. 362 at 636-
50). Defendant also told Detective Jerry Thompson that the child 
had fallen after defendant had "knocked her silly" (R. 361 at 
470-78). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Although defendant's pre-arrest statements and acts may 
have been obtained in violation of Miranda, that violation did 
not invalidate his subsequent confession obtained after proper 
Miranda warnings and a valid waiver by defendant of his rights 
under Miranda. Because defendant's pre-arrest statements and 
acts were not compelled in violation of the fifth amendment, his 
post-arrest confession, which was obtained after proper Miranda 
warnings and a valid waiver, was admissible. 
The body of the victim, which was physical evidence 
acquired after the alleged Miranda violation, was admissible in 
spite of the violation. While defendant's statements and 
testimonial acts which led the police to the body were excludable 
under Miranda, the physical evidence discovered as a result of 
those statements and acts was properly admitted. 
INTRODUCTION 
In Brown v. Pickard, denying reh'g, 4 Utah 292, 11 P. 
512 (1886), the Utah Supreme Court set forth the standard for 
determining whether a petition for rehearing should be granted: 
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be 
made. We must be convinced that the court 
failed to consider some material point in the 
case, or that it erred in its conclusions, or 
that some matter has been discovered which 
was unknown at the time of the hearing. 
4 Utah at 294, 11 P. at 512 (citation omitted). In Cumminqs v. 
Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1913), the Court stated: 
To make an application for a rehearing is a 
matter of right, and we have no desire to 
discourage the practice of filing petitions 
for rehearings in proper cases. When this 
court, however, has considered and decided 
all of the material questions involved in a 
case, a rehearing should not be applied for, 
unless we have misconstrued or overlooked 
some material fact or facts, or have 
overlooked some statute or decision which may 
affect the result, or that we have based the 
decision on some wrong principle of law, or 
have either misapplied or overlooked 
something which materially affects the result 
. . . . If there are some reasons, however, 
such as we have indicated above, or other 
good reasons, a petition for a rehearing 
should be promptly filed and, if it is 
meritorious, its form will in no case be 
scrutinized by this court. 
42 Utah at 172-73, 129 P. at 624. The argument portion of this 
brief will demonstrate that, based on these standards, the 
State's petition for rehearing is properly before the Court and 
should be granted. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
MIRANDA, ABSENT SOME CIRCUMSTANCE WHICH 
VIOLATES THE FIFTH AMENDMENT DIRECTLY, DOES 
NOT TAINT A SUBSEQUENT CONFESSION WHICH WAS 
OBTAINED IN CONFORMANCE WITH MIRANDA. 
As this Court noted in its opinion, the State did not 
address the Miranda waiver issue on appeal, choosing instead to 
focus on the noncustodial aspect of the questioning at the time 
of the polygraph examination and prior to defendant's arrest. 
Sampson, slip op. at 15. For purposes of further review, the 
State does not concede that the interrogation was custodial; 
however, on petition for rehearing, the State presents the 
following argument on the waiver issue. 
This Court, in footnote 14 of its opinion, apparently 
believed the State did not think that "the second set of Miranda 
warnings are of any consequence to [the Court's] analysis." The 
Court then applied Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), in 
concluding that defendant's post-arrest confession, obtained 
after a second set of Miranda warnings and a valid waiver, must 
also be suppressed. This conclusion reflects a misapprehension 
of the law. 
In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), the United 
States Supreme Court addressed the issue of the admissibility of 
the defendant's second statement, after proper Miranda warnings, 
which followed his prior, unwarned statement. The Elstad case 
required the Court 
to decide whether an initial failure of law 
enforcement officers to administer the 
warnings required by Miranda . . ., without 
more, "taints" subsequent admissions made 
after a suspect has been fully advised of and 
has waived his Miranda rights. 
470 U.S. at 300 (citation omitted). Elstad had made unwarned 
statements to the police, then was taken to the police station 
where he was advised of his Miranda rights. His subsequent 
statements were admitted although the trial court suppressed the 
earlier, unwarned statements. 470 U.S. at 301-302. 
The Court reiterated that the Miranda warnings are 
"'not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but [are] 
instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory 
self-incrimination [is] protected.'" 470 U.S. at 305 (quoting 
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)). The Court then 
compared this circumstance with the exclusionary rule enforced 
for violations of the fourth amendment, i.e., illegal arrests or 
searches. The exclusionary rule is enforced for constitutional 
violations; a Miranda violation is not necessarily a fifth 
amendment violation. The Court said: 
The Miranda exclusionary rule, however, 
serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more 
broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself. It 
may be triggered even in the absence of a 
Fifth Amendment violation. The Fifth 
Amendment prohibits use by the prosecution in 
its case in chief only of compelled 
testimony. Failure to administer Miranda 
warnings creates a presumption of compulsion. 
But the Miranda presumption, though 
irrebuttable for purposes of the 
prosecution's case in chief, does not require 
that the statements and their fruits be 
discarded as inherently tainted. 
4 70 U.S. at 306-307 (emphasis in original). Thus, voluntary 
statements taken in violation of Miranda may still be used £i 
impeachment purposes, for example 4 70 U.S. at
 ? (citing 
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)). 
Elstad contended that his warned statements w^re "fruit 
of Hie poisonous tree,." and thus should be suppressed under Wong 
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The Court rejected 
this contention, stating: 
The Court [in Michigan v. Tucker] concluded 
that the unwarned questioning "did not 
abridge respondent's constitutional privilege 
. . . but departed only from the prophylactic 
standards later laid down by this Court in 
Miranda to safeguard that privilege." 
470 U.S. cif "*0 8 (quoting Tucker, 4.1/ U.S. at 446)). Because 
"'policemen investigating serious crimes [cannot realistically be 
expected rcj make no errors whatsoever[f }'" a violation of 
Miranda should not be treated the same as a fifth amendment 
violation, 4 70 U.S. at 308. • 
11 errors are made by law enforcement 
officers in administering the prophylactic 
Miranda procedures, they should not breed the 
same irremediable consequences as police 
infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself. 
It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to 
hold that a simple failure to administer the 
warnings, unaccompanied by any actual 
coercion or other circumstances calculated to 
undermine the suspect's ability to exercise 
his free will, so taints the investigatory 
process that a subsequent voluntary and 
informed waiver is ineffective for some 
indeterminate period. Though Miranda 
requires that the unwarned admission must be 
suppressed, the admissibility of any 
subsequent statement should turn in these 
circumstances solely on whether it is 
knowingly and voluntarily made. 
470 U.S. at 309. 
Having determined that a Miranda violation, without any 
accompanying compulsion, is not a constitutional violation, the 
Court held that the Wong Sun "fruit of the poisonous tree" 
doctrine did not apply. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 305, 310. Nor did a 
Miranda violation fall within the doctrine that a prior statement 
had "let the cat out of the bag." United States v. Bayer, 331 
U.S. 532 (1947). In Bayer, the Court had said: 
[A]fter an accused has once let the cat out 
of the bag by confessing, no matter what the 
inducement, he is never thereafter free of 
the psychological and practical disadvantages 
of having confessed. . . . In such a sense, 
a later confession may always be looked upon 
as fruit of the first. But this Court has 
never gone so far as to hold that making a 
confession under circumstances which preclude 
its use, perpetually disables the confessor 
from making a usable one after those 
conditions have been removed. 
331 U.S. at 540-41. Based on this precedent, the Elstad Court 
stated: 
This Court has never held that the 
psychological impact of voluntary disclosure 
of a guilty secret qualifies as state 
compulsion or compromises the voluntariness 
of a subsequent informed waiver. 
We must conclude that, absent deliberately 
coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the 
initial statement, the mere fact that a 
suspect has made an unwarned admission does 
not warrant a presumption of compulsion. A 
subsequent administration of Miranda warnings 
to a suspect who has given a voluntary but 
unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice 
to remove the conditions that precluded 
admission of the earlier statement, 
4 T) n s. c3t < l ::, M «;i 
The Utah Supreme Court, quoting Elstad, has agreed with 
this principle. In State v. Bishop, 7 53 P. 2d 43 9, 4 h 5-fib iiil.ih 
1988), the Court applied the Elstad principle in determining that 
Bishop's post-Miranda statements were admissible because they 
"were not the product of coercion or duress, but were voluntarily 
made." 75 3 P. 2d at 466, The post-Miranda statements were not 
tainted by prior unwarned statements The Coi irt even deter m I i led 
that although the unwarned statements should have been 
suppressed, their admission was harmless error. I i 
Elstad differs from the present case i r. - -.at Elstad was 
not given Miranda warnings; here, this Court has determined that 
defendant was given the warnings and equivocally refer ret I to his 
a right to have counsel present. This Court, with no analysis of 
Elstad, determined that "an equivocal reference to counsel" is 
governed by Edwards v. Arizona an*I further' police questioning 
could not occur unless defendant initiated the contact. Sampson, 
slip op, at . - and 18 n.17. However, whether an equivocal 
reference to c ocation of the right to counsel 
under Miranda was not the issue in Edwards. in that case, the 
United States Supreme Court said: 
We further hold that an accused , , , having 
expressed his desire to deal with the police 
only through counsel, is not subject to 
further interrogation by the authorities 
until counsel has been made available to him, 
unless the accused himself initiates further 
communication, exchanges, or conversations 
with the police. 
We . . . emphasize that it is inconsistent 
with Miranda and its progeny for the 
authorities, at their instance, to 
reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has 
clearly asserted his right to counsel 
451 U.S. at 484-85 (emphasis added). In short, contrary to the 
apparent view of this Court, Edwards did not address, and 
therefore does not govern, the situation where the suspect makes 
an equivocal request for or reference to counsel. Indeed, in a 
footnote, the Edwards Court strongly suggested that the rule of 
that case does not apply in the equivocal request situation. 451 
U.S. at 486 n.9. After citing decisions of the federal circuit 
courts of appeals which have held that "a valid waiver of an 
accused's previously invoked Fifth Amendment right to counsel is 
possible," and specifically noting the rule of the Fifth Circuit, 
which is the rule adopted in Edwards, the Court said, "Waiver is 
possible . . . when the request for counsel is equivocal." Id. 
(citing Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc); 
Thompson v. Wainwriqht, 601 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1979)). 
By implication, this Court reached a similar conclusion 
in State v. Griffin, 754 P.2d 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), where it 
held that "when an accused makes an arguably equivocal request 
for counsel during custodial interrogation, further questioning 
must be limited to clarifying the request." 754 P.2d at 969. In 
so holding, the Court implicitly recognized that an equivocal 
request for counsel is treated differently than a clear assertion 
of the right to have counsel present, in that further 
questioning, albeit limited, may occur after the equivocal 
request—something Edwards forbids after a clear assertion of the 
right to counsel. If an equivocal request were treated as a 
clear assertion. • ' :• i.jht, ml «K: i f i :a I ion *i 'he equivocal request 
through additional interrogation would violate Edwards. 
Thus, the issue presented in the instant case is 
whether defendant's equivocal reference to counsel during the 
polygraph examination, which this Court determined was not 
clarified by the officers as requi red by Griffin, Sampson, siip 
op. at 20, Is tantamount to an invocation of the right to have 
counsel present, such that, as this Court concluded, "the timts 
of [defendant's] post-arrest .errogations must also be 
suppressed [under Edwards v. Arizona]," id. at 14 n .14. This 
issue '. s properly resolved in a manner contrary ! - 1 l.e Court's 
conclusion under the analysis followed by the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Martin v. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 918 (11th CIr. 
1985), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 909 (1986), modified in unrelated 
part, 781 F.2d 185 (11th Cir. 1986). 
In Martin, the court found that Martin's question, 
"Can t wfL* wait until tomorrow," during police interrogation on 
July 4, was an equivocal request to cut off questioning. 7 70 
F.2d at 923. Such a request must he rreated similarly to an 
equivocal request for an attorney, i.e., further questioning must 
be limited to clarifying the request 7 7 0 F.2d at 924. Because 
the officers did not. clarify the equi\ oca 1 request, the 
The state will hereafter refer to defendant's statement to 
Sergeant Elliott regarding counsel as an "equivocal reference to 
counsel," in accordance with this Court's suggestion that it be 
characterized as such. Sampson, slip op, at 16 n.l 5. 
confession made by Martin on July 4 was inadmissible because it 
was obtained in violation of Miranda. 770 F.2d at 928. The 
analysis did not end there, however, as the court then analyzed 
whether the July 4 confession rendered inadmissible a subsequent 
confession obtained in compliance with Miranda. 
The court first determined that the July 4 confession, 
though inadmissible under Miranda, was voluntary under the fifth 
amendment. Having determined that the confession was voluntary, 
the court applied Elstad to determine if a subsequent confession 
on July 11 was admissible. The later confession was obtained 
after Martin had validly waived his Miranda rights. 770 F.2d at 
930. Because the July 4 confession was voluntary, the July 11 
confession was admissible. 770 F.2d at 929. Following Elstad, 
the court found the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine 
inapplicable. It stated: 
The instant case differs from Elstad in 
that it involves a failure to honor the 
suspect's request to "cut off" questioning 
rather than a failure to give Miranda 
warnings. Nevertheless, the same reasoning 
necessarily applies. As explained in the 
preceding subsection, Martin's July 4 
confession was voluntary. As in Elstad, the 
police here violated the technical 
requirements of Miranda, but did not violate 
the Fifth Amendment itself. The absence of 
"actual coercion" in connection with the July 
4 interrogation renders the "fruit of the 
poisonous tree" doctrine inapplicable, and we 
hold that the July 4 Miranda violation does 
not automatically require the exclusion of 
the July 11 confession on this ground. 
770 F.2d at 928 (emphasis in original). See also Elledge v. 
Duqqer, 823 F.2d 1439, 1443 (11th Cir. 1987) (not honoring a 
request to stop questioning is the same as failing to give the 
Miranda warnings; both are technical violations of Miranda, but 
neither violate the fifth amendment). 
Nor was the "cat out of the bag" rule applicable. 
Quoting Elstad/ the court said: 
["]When neither the initial nor the 
subsequent admission is coerced/ little 
justification exists for permitting the 
highly probative evidence of a voluntary 
confession to be irretrievably lost to the 
factfinder. 
There is a vast difference between the 
direct consequences flowing from coercion of 
a confession by physical violence or other 
deliberate means calculated to break the 
suspect's will and the uncertain consequences 
of disclosure of a "guilty secret" freely 
given in response to an unwarned but 
noncoercive question.["] 
770 F.2d at 929 (emphasis in original) (quoting Oregon v. Elstad/ 
470 U.S. 298/ 312 (1985)). 
>..-...;,, . e court examined whether the admission of 
the July 4 confession was harmless error. After reviewing the 
record, the court concluded that it was; the July 4 confession 
was merely cumulative, the July 11 confession being "far more 
detailed." 770 F.2d at 932. In addition, the jury had \ he 
testimony of Martin's accomplice whom Martin had told of the 
murder, Having found that the July 11 confession was properly 
admitted, and that the admission of the , luiy 4 i-onfession UMS 
harmless error, the court affirmed the conviction. 770 F.2d at 
933. 
The same analysis applies \ i \ Le present case. While 
the officers' failure to clarify defendant's equivocal reference 
to the right to have an attorney present at t- ht - tonne the 
i ""i"i yijr aph w.n rnimini.bt.uied may have been a technical Miranda 
violation, there was no evidence of coercion or duress. 
Consequently, there was no constitutional violation when 
defendant was initially questioned. Since there was no 
constitutional violation, the Wong Sun "fruit of the poisonous 
tree" doctrine and the Bayer "cat out of the bag" rule do not 
apply. Although defendant's pre-arrest statements may have been 
inadmissible due to a Miranda violation, his subsequent post-
arrest confession, given after proper Miranda warnings and an 
unequivocal waiver of his rights, was admissible. 
Furthermore, the admission of defendant's pre-arrest 
statements, made after the equivocal reference to counsel, was 
harmless error, at most. The only statement made in response to 
questioning by the officers was that the victim was dead. In 
light of the noninculpatory nature of that statement, the later 
confession which was far more detailed, the testimony of 
defendant's family members about the condition of the child, the 
testimony of the medical examiner, and the testimony of 
defendant's roommate about the noises in the apartment when 
defendant was striking the child, the admission of the statement 
The trial court did not err in finding that defendant's 
statements were not coerced. Elstad teaches us that a statement 
taken in violation of Miranda is not necessarily compelled or 
coerced in violation of the fifth amendment. To the extent that 
footnote 6 of this Court's opinion suggests that the trial court 
could not have found an absence of coercion, it is inconsistent 
with Elstad. Footnote 6 reads: 
The court's comment on coercion represents 
a bit of an overstatement in view of 
Miranda's recognition that custodial 
interrogation is inherently coercive. 
Sampson, slip op. at 5 n.6 (citation omitted). 
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that the child wah dead wat; harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
See Martin v. Wainwriqht, 770 F.2d at 932-33; State v. Hackford, 
737 P.2d 200, 204-70r> (Utah 1987) (discussing and applying 
3 federal constitutional harmless error rule), 
POINT II 
EVIDENCE ABOUT THE VICTIM'S BODY WAS PROPERLY 
ADMITTED AT TRIAL. 
t«... ---lough this Court concluded that defendant's pre-
arrest statements were inadmissible because they were obtained In 
violation of Miranda, : lalyze the question of 
whether the victim's body, which was discovered as a result of 
those statements and defendant's verbal and physical directions 
tn Lhe officers, wda admissible physical evidence. The Court 
suggested that that evidence would not be admissible unless it 
were " saved by an except I on t o t; he exc 1 us iunary rule. " Sampson/ 
slip op, at 21, However, the victim's body, although discovered 
as a result of the statements and acts obtained in violation of 
Miranda, was ne^  ^ei: theless admissible physical evidence. Resort 
to an exception to the exclusionary rule, such -*< Lhe 
"independent source doctrine" OT the ' mnvir.a discovery rule/ 
see Sampson, slip op. at 21 n19, is not necessary. "The Fifth 
3 
The same is true with respect to the admission of defendants 
testimonial acts in leading the police to his daughter's body. 
The admissibility of those testimonial acts is discussed below in 
Point II. 
4 
Insofar as defendant's disclosure of the location of the 
victim's body involved physical acts of defendant (as opposed to 
statements), those acts probably would be considered testimonial 
acts which, because they occurred after a Miranda violation, were 
not admissible, along with defendant's pre-arrest statements. 
See State v. Wethered, 110 Wash.2d 466, 755 P.2d 797, 798-800 
(1988). 
Amendment, of course, is not concerned with nontestimonial 
evidence." Elstad, 470 U.S. at 305. See also Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966) (defendant may be compelled 
to supply blood samples). 
In Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974), the 
United States Supreme Court "expressly left open the question of 
the admissibility of physical evidence obtained as a result of an 
interrogation conducted contrary to the rules set forth in 
Mirandaf.1" Patterson v. United States, 485 U.S. 922 (1988) 
(White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). By an evenly 
divided vote, the Court denied certiorari in a case which would 
have squarely addressed that issue. Massachusetts v. White, 439 
U.S. 280 (1978). Subsequently, the majority of the jurisdictions 
which have addressed the issue have held that a Miranda violation 
does not require exclusion of the derivative evidence obtained 
from the inadmissible statement. 
Although Tucker specifically declined to resolve the 
issue of derivative evidence, that decision is almost unanimously 
read to support the concept that derivative evidence from a 
statement taken in violation of Miranda is admissible. In 
Tucker, the Court determined that, although Tucker's statement 
was obtained in violation of Miranda, there was no violation of 
the fifth amendment. Tucker's statement was properly excluded; 
however, the testimony of a third-party witness, whose name was 
discovered as a result of Tucker's statement, was admissible. 
417 U.S. at 450. 
In New York v, Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), the 
Supreme i~ t 3 issue oI the 
admissibility of physical evidence which was "non-testimonial." 
467 U.S. at 660 n. S . However, the Court, in holding tha t: t.hpr P 
is a public safety exception to Miranda, said: 
[A]bsent actual coercion by the officer there 
is no constitutional imperative requiring the 
exclusion of the evidence that results from 
police inquiry of this kind; and we do not 
believe that the doctrinal underpinnings of 
Miranda require us to exclude the evidence[.] 
467 U.S. at 658 n.7. Th is language appears to support a 
distinction between Miranda violations and fifth amendment 
violations . . .ation to the admission of physical evidence 
seized as a result of statements by a defendant. 
Some of the federal circuit courts have declined to 
rule on the issue since Tucker. See United States v. Scalf, 7 08 
Ji i:40. 1545-45 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v. Downinq, 
665 F.. : rir. 1981). But those courts which 
have addressed the point have held that a Miranda violation does 
not make the derivative evidence inadmissible See United States 
v. Patterson, 812 F.2d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 
485 U.S. 922 (1988) (Wong Sun "fruit of the poisonous tree" 
doctrinp not applI cab]P; physical pvidence admissible wher 1 there 
is a Miranda violation but not a fifth amendment violation); 
United States v. Gonzalez-Sandoval, 894 F. 2d 104 3 , 1 04fl (, 'M h f" 1 r 
] 9 90) (reasoning of Elstad and Tucker applies to nontestimonial 
physical evidence obtained as a result of a Miranda violation); 
United States ex rel Hudson v. Cannon, 5-'" 1 F ,,l< 1 H ^ 0 , H (14 •  H CI | ) r h 
Cir. 1976) (third party testimonial fruits of a voluntary 
statement are admissible, even if there has been a Miranda 
violation); United States v. Barte, 868 F.2d 773, 774 (5th Cir.)/ 
cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 547 (1989) ("A mere violation of 
Miranda's 'prophylactic' procedures does not trigger the fruit of 
the poisonous tree doctrine. The derivative evidence rule 
operates only when an actual constitutional violation occurs, as 
where a suspect confesses in response to coercion."); United 
States v. Benqivenqa, 845 F.2d 593, 600-601 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 109 S.Ct. 306 (1988) (nontestimonial physical evidence is 
admissible even if it had been obtained in violation of Miranda); 
United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1209-10 (5th Cir. 1985), 
cert, denied, 479 U.S. 1056 (1987) (while statements taken in 
violation of Miranda are inadmissible, defendant's consent to 
search and the derivative evidence of the search are admissible 
if they are not the product of an actual violation of a 
constitutional right); United States v. Medina, 887 F.2d 528, 533 
(5th Cir. 1989) (failure to give Miranda warnings alone will not 
necessitate suppression of derivative evidence absent a 
constitutional violation). 
Although the Utah appellate courts have not addressed 
this issue, other state courts have. In State v. Wethered, 110 
Wash.2d 466, 755 P.2d 797 (1988), the Washington Supreme Court 
said: 
The [United States Supreme] Court in Tucker . 
. . held that the exclusion of some secondary 
evidence would be warranted by a true Fifth 
Amendment violation involving coercion, but 
not a mere Miranda violation. Tucker, at 
444-45, 94 S.Ct. at 2363-64. Although the 
Court has not directly addressed the question 
of admissibility of physical evidence 
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discovered through a confession given without 
Miranda warnings, admitting such derivative 
evidence appears to be the logical next step 
in the Court's reasoning. . . . Dictum in 
Elstad strongly suggests that a Miranda 
violation without actual coercion will not 
taint evidence derived from a confession, no 
matter what form such evidence takes. 
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308, 105 S.Ct. at 1292 
("no actual infringement of the suspect's 
constitutional rights, the case was not 
controlled by the doctrine expressed in Wong 
Sun that fruits of a constitutional violation 
must be suppressed"). 
755 P. 2d at 801. The Washington court held that it was "bound by 
the United States Supreme Court's determination that evidence 
derived from a confession made in violation of Miranda . . . need 
not be suppressed under the Fifth Amendment absent actual 
coercion." 755 P.2d at 802. See also Crew v. State, 100 Nev. 
38, 675 P.2d 986, 989 (1984) ("Absent a direct infringement on 
fifth amendment rights, a violation of the rules of Miranda will 
not support the exclusion of evidence derived from the 
statement."); State v. Kutnyak, 211 Mont. 155, 685 P.2d 901, 906 
(1984) (same language as Crew). 
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals also explained 
the admissibility of derivative evidence in In re Owen F., 70 
Md.App. 678, 523 A.2d 627, cert, denied, 310 Md. 275, 528 A.2d 
1286 (Md. 1987). The Maryland court said: 
Evidence derived from a confession 
obtained without the benefit of a Miranda 
warning is excluded, if at all, under a 
relatively narrow interpretation of the 
"fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine. 
Under that interpretation, a failure to 
provide the Miranda warning does not 
necessarily preclude the introduction of 
derivative evidence. Rather, that evidence 
is inadmissible only if the confession from 
which it was derived was coerced in violation 
of defendant's right to due process. . . . 
Clearly, then, obtaining a confession in 
violation of the Miranda rule does not 
automatically destroy the admissibility of 
evidence discovered by using the unwarned 
confession. 
523 A.2d at 631 (footnote and citations omitted). See also State 
v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 562, 517 A.2d 1162, 1168 (1986) ("Only 
coerced statements in violation of Miranda constitute a 
contravention of constitutional rights so as to require the 
suppression of the violation's derivative evidence."); Bartram v. 
State, 33 Md.App. 115, 364 A.2d 1119, 1145-47 (1976) (mere 
Miranda violation does not trigger the "fruit of the poisonous 
tree" doctrine); State v. Doughty, 456 N.W.2d 445, 447 (Minn.App. 
1990), review granted, July 31, 1990 (Tucker and Elstad 
demonstrate that the Supreme Court "would not apply the 
derivative evidence rule to exclude the fruits of a Miranda 
violation where the statement elicited from the accused was 
knowingly and voluntarily made"). But see People v. Creach, 69 
Ill.App.3d 874, 387 N.E.2d 762, 776 (1979), cert, denied, 449 
U.S. 1010 (1980) (pre-Elstad, and with no analysis, the court 
held admission of derivative evidence was prejudicial error); 
Commonwealth v. White, 371 N.E.2d 777, 781 (Mass. 1977), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 280 (1978) (pre-Elstad, and relying on the 
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, the court held that 
derivative evidence was inadmissible); State v. Preston, 411 A. 2d 
402, 408-409 (Me. 1980) (pre-Elstad, and noting that an 
inevitable discovery rule had not yet been adopted by the United 
States Supreme Court, the court held that derivative evidence was 
inadmissible). 
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In the instant case, this Court has determined that 
defendant's pre-arrest statements were inadmissible due to a 
Miranda violation. Any non-verbal acts by defendant in taking 
the police officers to the body were probably testimonial in 
nature and therefore also inadmissible after the alleged Miranda 
violation. See State v. Wethered, 755 P.2d at 798-800. However, 
the physical evidence, the body itself, was admissible under the 
extensions of Tucker and Elstad which have been expounded by the 
cases set out above. Evidence derived from a statement or 
confession obtained in violation of Miranda is excludable, if at 
all, under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. Under 
Elstad, that doctrine is inapplicable to a Miranda violation 
which is not a fifth amendment violation. 
Since the trial court specifically found that 
defendant's pre-arrest statements and testimonial acts were not 
compelled in violation of the fifth amendment, the physical 
evidence derived from those statements and acts—i.e., the 
victim's body—was admissible. So also was the evidence of the 
medical examination of the victim which helped to establish the 
element of depraved indifference for second degree murder. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(c) (1990). 
This Court need not remand this matter. From the 
record, this Court can determine that defendant's confession, 
taken after his arrest and the second set of Miranda warnings, 
was admissible and that the admission of the pre-arrest 
statements and acts was harmless error. This Court can also 
determine that the victim's body, and the attendant medical 
testimony, were properly admitted. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, it appears that the 
Court in State v. Sampson either overlooked or misapprehended 
significant case law in determining that both defendant's pre-
arrest statements and confession should have been suppressed. 
This Court also failed to address the admissibility of the 
physical evidence which was properly admitted by the trial court. 
Therefore, the State's petition for rehearing should be granted 
and defendant's homicide conviction and sentence affirmed. 
Counsel for the State hereby certifies that this petition is 
presented in good faith and not for purposes of delay. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 1 — day of October, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Petition for Rehearing were mailed, postage 
prepaid, to Andrew Valdez, Elizabeth A. Bowman, and Richard G. 
Uday, Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc, Attorneys for defendant, 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 
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ORME, Judge: 
Defendant appeals his conviction for criminal homicide, 
murder in the second degree, a first degree felony in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990). We reverse and remand for 
a new trial. 
On November 24, 1986, at approximately 10:30 p.m., 
defendant entered a 7-Eleven store in Salt Lake County and told 
the clerks that his daughter had been kidnapped. He asked them 
to call the police, which they did. 
Deputies from the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office 
responded. Defendant informed them that his daughter had been 
abducted from his truck. He gave them a description of his 
daughter and a photograph. The officers investigated the 
alleged kidnapping until 4:00 a.m. At some point during the 
evening, defendant was informed the police did not believe his 
story. The officers asked defendant to come to headquarters 
the following morning for a polygraph examination. He agreed. 
At approximately 10:30 a.m. on November 25, defendant 
arrived at police headquarters. He was met by the polygraph 
examiner, Sergeant Elliot, who had been briefed about the 
events which occurred on the prior evening. Defendant was 
escorted to a small interrogation room, hooked up to a 
polygraph machine, and instructed about how polygraph machines 
worked. Sgt. Elliot then explained the purpose for giving 
defendant the test. He said: 
When we walk out of here we ought to be 
able to tell the detectives Carlos is 
truthful when he says the child was taken 
out of the truck, he had not prearranged 
with anyone to take the child. Uh, also, 
Carlos is not involved in the death of the 
child if the child is, in fact, dead. 
And, uh, those are the two things that we 
will accomplish today.1 
After explaining to defendant the purpose of the test, 
Sgt. Elliot gave defendant the Miranda warnings. He began by 
stating: "Because you are in the cop shop there is no doubt in 
your mind that this is the police station and, uh, because you 
are in taking a polygraph from a law enforcement agency I must 
advise you of your rights again."2 After reading defendant 
each of his rights, the following exchange ensued: 
1. These purposes were again repeated during the exam, with 
even more specificity. Later in the exam, Sgt. Elliot stated: 
Okay, good, okay, uh, at the beginning of 
the test I told you what the things were 
that we needed to show. Number one is 
that you did not arrange with anyone to 
take the child but that you haven't got 
someone taking care of her, she is not 
hidden out and you are not doing this to 
deprive Antoinette visitation of the 
child. And, uh, secondly, you did nothing 
to injure the child and you, and if she in 
fact is not alive, did not cause her 
death, right? 
2. It is not clear from the record why Sgt. Elliot stated that 
he had to advise defendant of his rights "again." It is clear, 
however, that the first and only Miranda warnings defendant 
received prior to his formal arrest were given by Sgt. Elliot 
at the outset of the polygraph examination. 
Elliot: Okay, having these rights in mind 
do you wish to talk to me now. 
Sampson: Well, uh, should I have a 
lawyer, I mean, well, I'm really not 
worried about anything, it is just 
that . . . . 
Elliot: Okay, if you are not worried 
about anything I would say that is fine, 
let's go ahead and proceed. Let's get 
this thing done and get it over with and 
see what we can do. 
Sampson: I'm willing to get it over with. 
Defendant then read and signed a form listing his Miranda 
rights and indicating his willingness to take the polygraph 
test. 
During the polygraph examination, Sgt. Elliot asked 
defendant whether he arranged the disappearance or caused the 
death of his child and whether he knew where she was 
hidden.3 He asked defendant this series of questions four 
times. To the question concerning where his daughter was 
hidden, defendant responded in the negative each time and each 
time the polygraph suggested a deceitful response. After the 
last set of questions, Sgt. Elliot informed defendant about the 
test results. He asked defendant why his response to the 
question concerning whether he knew where his daughter was 
hidden appeared to be false. Defendant said he thought maybe 
the child's mother had done something with her. 
After concluding the examination, Sgt. Elliot and 
defendant went to find Salt Lake County Sheriff Pete Hayward. 
Sgt. Elliot told Sheriff Hayward about the test results. He 
told him that he believed defendant had been untruthful and 
informed him that defendant had been "Mirandized," but 
3. The specific inculpatory questions asked during the 
examination were: 
1) Have you caused the death of Miyako? 
2) Do you know where Miyako is hidden now? 
3) Have you arranged the disappearance of 
Miyako? 
apparently did not acquaint the sheriff with the particulars of 
defendant's responses after his rights had been read to him. 
Sheriff Hayward then returned with defendant to the 
polygraph room for further questioning. He did not give 
defendant the Miranda warnings.4 He informed defendant that 
there were inconsistencies in his story and that he did not 
believe defendant was telling the truth. He then asked 
defendant whether he had injured his daughter. Ultimately, 
defendant stated his daughter was dead and that he could show 
the police where she was located. 
Defendant accompanied Sheriff Hayward and another deputy 
to a dumpster in American Fork where his daughter's body was 
located. After retrieving the body, the officers placed 
defendant under arrest and returned him to Salt Lake City. 
When the officers again met with defendant, defendant was read 
his Miranda rights. He agreed to talk with the investigating 
officer, who thereafter questioned him concerning the 
circumstances surrounding his daughter's death. 
Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion to suppress 
all statements made by defendant during and after the polygraph 
examination on November 25, 1986, and all evidence derived as a 
result of those statements. Counsel argued that the police 
officers had violated defendant's Miranda rights by continuing 
to question him after he made an equivocal request for 
counsel. The trial court denied the motion. 
In support of its decision to deny defendant's motion to 
suppress, the court stated in pertinent part: 
The court finds, first, that as you 
have agreed, the standard of evidence must 
be a preponderance of the evidence5 to 
4. It is not entirely clear why the sheriff did not give 
defendant his Miranda warnings. Apparently, however, he relied 
upon Sgt. Elliot's explanation that defendant had been 
"Mirandized.H 
5. At least one Utah case has recognized Hpreponderance of the 
evidence" as the appropriate standard for determining the 
voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda rights. See State v. 
Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985). The preponderance 
standard is difficult to square with Miranda's holding that the 
state bears a heavy burden, if counsel was not present, to show 
a knowing and intelligent waiver of the defendant's Miranda 
establish the voluntariness of the 
interrogation and waiver. 
Court finds that the defendant 
clearly understood what his rights were 
and what he was waiving, that there is 
nothing in the record to show that the 
police did anything or acted in any way 
improperly so as to constitute any kind of 
coercion6 in this matter so as to cause 
the defendant not to fully understand his 
rights and to leave him in a position 
where he was acting in a coerced sort of 
way. • . . 
I believe he had an unfettered right 
of choice, that he did not request an 
attorney, that the language -Well, ah, 
should I have a lawyer, I mean, well, I'm 
really not worried about anything, it is 
just that . . ."is not sufficient to 
cause the police to be concerned as to the 
claim or any suggestion that the defendant 
wished to claim a right to counsel. 
I also find that there was no need to 
give continuous advice as to subsequent 
requests for the selection of counsel7 
or the waiver of the same. 
I also find further that the forum 
was adequate, the [rights] were clearly 
(Footnote 5 continued) 
rights. See Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). 
Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court has adopted the 
"preponderance of the evidence" test in evaluating Miranda 
waiver questions. Colorado v. Connelly. 479 U.S. 157, 107 
S.Ct. 515, 523 (1986K 
6. The court's comment on coercion represents a bit of an 
overstatement in view of Miranda's recognition that custodial 
interrogation is inherently coercive. See 384 U.S. at 467. 
7. Despite the court's phraseology in its remarks from the 
bench, it is apparent from the record that defendant never made 
any "subsequent requests" for counsel after his statement to 
Sgt. Elliot. 
explained to the defendant. He 
voluntarily and knowingly waived his right 
to counsel and I cannot find that the 
motion to suppress should be granted and, 
therefore, it is denied. 
A five-day jury trial was held in September 1987. Having 
lost his motion to suppress, defendant sought and obtained a 
continuing objection to the admission of evidence resulting 
from the police interrogation. At the conclusion of the trial, 
the jury found defendant guilty of second degree homicide. He 
was sentenced to a term of five years to life at the Utah State 
Prison. 
Defendant has raised numerous issues on appeal, but his 
primary contention is that the court committed prejudicial 
error when it denied his motion to suppress. Because we must 
reverse and remand on this issue, we need not address the other 
issues raised by defendant. 
Neither party has identified the standard of review for 
this appeal. However, both parties apparently concede that the 
trial court's ultimate conclusions concerning the waiver of 
defendant's Miranda rights, which conclusions were based upon 
essentially undisputed facts, in particular the transcript of 
Sgt. Elliot's colloquy with defendant, present questions of law 
reviewable under a correction-of-error standard. Such a 
conclusion is consistent with the general notion that a trial 
court's "findings" based upon undisputed facts present 
questions of law on appeal. Diversified Equities, Inc. v. 
American Sav. & Loan Assoc, 739 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) (quoting City of Spencer v. Hawkey Sec. Ins. Co., 216 
N.W.2d 406, 408 (Iowa 1974)). ££. Transamerica Cash Reserve, 
Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 1990) 
(same standard for review of summary judgment, which 
necessarily involves undisputed facts). See also People v. 
Russo, 148 Cal. App. 3d 1172, 196 Cal. Rptr. 466, 468 (1983) 
(where Miranda warnings and ensuing discussion were recorded, 
facts deemed undisputed and appellate court required to 
"independently assess whether [defendant] knowingly and 
intelligently waived his rights"). Thus, we do not accord any 
particular deference to the trial court's conclusions, although 
couched as findings, but, rather, review them for correctness. 
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the United 
States Supreme Court stated that ••the prosecution may not use 
statements . . . stemming from custodial interrogation of the 
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural 
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against 
self-incrimination.- I£. at 444. One of those procedural 
safeguards is a warning that the defendant has the right to an 
attorney during custodial interrogation. XJJ. Moreover, the 
Court noted that if defendant -indicates in any manner and at 
any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an 
attorney before speaking there can be no questioning.- I&. at 
444-45. Finally, when custodial interrogation continues 
without the presence of a defense attorney and damaging 
evidence results from the interrogation, the state has a heavy 
burden to show that the defendant knowingly and intelligently 
waived his Miranda rights. i£. at 475. 
We must address two questions in this appeal. First, we 
must determine whether defendant was subject to "custodial 
interrogation" at the time he made his incriminating 
statements. Second, assuming custodial interrogation, we must 
determine whether defendant requested, or knowingly and 
intelligently waived his right to, counsel. 
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION 
Initially, defendant claims the state failed to raise 
below the issue of whether there actually was a "custodial 
interrogation" and thus should be precluded from arguing on 
appeal that there was not. See generally State v. Marshall, 
791 P.2d 880, 885-87 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Though we agree the 
state did not dwell on the issue, it was sufficiently raised at 
the suppression hearing to be preserved for this appeal. We 
note, however, that the trial court did not base its denial of 
the motion to suppress upon the lack of custody nor intimate 
any doubt that the colloquy between Sgt. Elliot and defendant 
occurred in conjunction with a custodial interrogation. 
Instead, it concluded that defendant was informed of his 
rights, understood his rights, and voluntarily waived 
them—conclusions which would be irrelevant if the court 
thought there had been no custodial interrogation. 
In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court defined 
-custodial interrogation" as -questioning initiated by law 
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody 
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 
(1966). The Court expanded on this definition in Oregon v. 
Mathiason, 425 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam). "Miranda warnings 
are required only where there has been such a restriction on a 
person's freedom as to render him 'in custody.1" I£. at 495. 
Later, in California v. Beheler. 463 U.S. 1121 (1983) (per 
curiam), the Court stated that "the ultimate inquiry is simply 
whether there is a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of 
movement* of the degree associated with a formal arrest." Id. 
at 1125. 
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has indicated 
that the test is an objective one, i.e., that "the only 
relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's 
position would have understood his situation." Berkemer v. 
McCartv, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984). See, e.g., Hunter v. State, 
590 P.2d 888, 895 (Alaska 1979) (The question is not whether 
the particular defendant considered himself in custody, but 
whether a "reasonable person [under the same circumstances] 
would feel he was not free to leave and break off police 
questioning."); People v. Algien, 180 Colo. 1, 501 P.2d 468, 
471 (1972) (en banc). 
The Utah Supreme Court has identified several key factors 
to consider in order to determine when a defendant 
who has not been formally arrested is in 
custody. They are: (1) the site of 
interrogation; (2) whether the 
investigation focused on the accused; (3) 
whether the objective indicia of arrest 
were present; and (4) the length and form 
of interrogation. 
Salt Lake Citv v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983). 
Another factor which we find pertinent to our analysis was 
recognized by our Oregon counterpart in State v. Herrera, 49 
Or. App. 1075, 621 P.2d 1209 (1980). That factor is (5) whether 
the defendant came to the place of interrogation freely and 
willingly. Id. at 1212. We now apply these five factors, 
along with the objective standard adopted in Berkemer, to the 
undisputed facts in this case. 
A brief mention of factors (1), (3) and (5) is sufficient 
because we find them relatively "neutral." Concerning factor 
(1), the site of interrogation was the police station. 
Station-house questioning lends itself to a finding of custody, 
a concept which Sgt. Elliot recognized in his "cop shop" 
introductory remark, although that fact alone is not 
conclusive. See, e.g., Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495. 
Considering factor (3), defendant was apparently not securely 
restrained or told that he was under arrest until after his 
daughter's body was discovered. However, it is pertinent to 
note that he was not specifically informed of his freedom to 
leave8 and that once the polygraph examination started, he 
was restrained in the limited sense that he was hooked to the 
polygraph machine.9 Turning to factor (5), the defendant 
went voluntarily to the police station after receiving an 
invitation to do so. The fact that he went voluntarily, 
however, does not mean he was free to leave during the entire 
remainder of the interrogation. 
The two factors which conclusively tip the scale and 
persuade us that defendant was in custody are factors (2), the 
focus of the investigation, and (4), the form of the 
interrogation. The interplay of these two factors at the time 
defendant made incriminating statements would lead a reasonable 
person to believe that he was not free to leave. 
Concerning factor (2), the state essentially concedes that 
the investigation in this case had focused exclusively on 
defendant. Before the conclusion of the evening when defendant 
reported the fictitious kidnapping, officers had informed 
defendant that they did not believe his story. As a result of 
their disbelief, they requested defendant to return the 
following morning for a polygraph test. Nothing in the record 
suggests other suspects were sought or questioned, or other 
leads pursued, in the meanwhile. The questions asked during 
the polygraph examination clearly indicate a strong suspicion 
that defendant had kidnapped or killed his own daughter. It is 
obvious from these facts that defendant was the prime, if not 
exclusive, suspect of the police investigation. A reasonable 
person under the circumstances would surely so have concluded, 
especially given the expressed disbelief at his story. 
Finally, factor (4) weighs heavily in favor of a 
determination of custody. Utah courts have placed a great deal 
of emphasis on the form of the questioning in these types of 
cases. As long as questioning remains merely investigatory, 
courts have not found custody. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 718 
P.2d 385, 391 (Utah 1986). However, when investigatory 
questioning shifts to accusatory questioning, custody is likely 
8. Under certain circumstances, even defendants who are told 
they are free to leave will nonetheless be held to have been 
subjected to custodial interrogation. See, e.g., United States 
v. Lee, 699 F.2d 466, 467-68 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). 
9. According to the transcript of the polygraph examination, 
the polygraph machine was attached to defendant by two tubes 
encircling his trunk, finger plates on his ring and index 
fingers, and a blood pressure cuff on his right arm. 
and Miranda warnings become necessary, earner, 664 P.2d at 
1170. £££ also Kellv, 718 P.2d at 391. The change from 
investigatory to accusatory questioning occurs when the "police 
have reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been 
committed and also reasonable grounds to believe that the 
defendant committed it." Carner, 664 P.2d at 1171. See also 
Kellv, 718 P.2d at 391. 
Assuming, without deciding, that the polygraph examination 
itself was merely investigatory,10 we find that the 
questioning became accusatory when Sgt. Elliot and Sheriff 
Hayward determined that defendant had lied on the exam. The 
officers knew prior to the polygraph exam that a crime had been 
committed. They suspected kidnapping and possibly even 
murder. Moreover, they clearly suspected defendant as the 
perpetrator of the crime. The polygraph exam results merely 
confirmed their suspicions. Knowing the suspicions of the 
police and then being confronted with the polygraph exam 
results, a reasonable person in defendant's position would not 
10. In view of the result we reach, we need not decide in this 
case whether the polygraph examination as such was accusatory 
interrogation and whether defendant was in custody from the 
inception of the exam. We note, however, that numerous courts 
have leaned toward finding such examinations to be custodial, a 
view which seems to command majority support and to be 
well-reasoned. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 97 N.J. 113, 477 
A.2d 1265, 1269 (1984) (noting that strict Miranda-type 
analysis is typically applied to polygraph confessions); 
Commonwealth v. Bennett, 439 Penn. 34, 264 A.2d 706, 707 (1970) 
(state's suggestion that defendant was not in custody for 
polygraph was "attempt to have [court] submerge [its] 
intelligence"); State v. Faller, 277 N.W.2d 433, 435 (S.D. 
1975) ("situation a lie detector test presents can best be 
described as a psychological rubber hose"); Creeks v. State, 
542 S.W.2d 849, 851 (Tex. 1976) (where investigation has 
focused on defendant, Miranda warnings required before 
polygraph); People v. Carter, 7 Cal. App. 3d 332, 88 Cal. Rptr. 
546, 549 (1970) ("Questioning during the course of a lie 
detector test certainly qualifies as a form of custodial 
interrogation."), overruled on other grounds, 6 Cal. 3d 441, 
492 P.2d 1, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1972). But see, e.g., Whalen v. 
State, 434 A.2d 1346, 1352 (Del. 1980)("appearance at the 
police station for the polygraph test demonstrates a waiver of 
his Miranda rights"), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 910 (1982); People 
v. Bailey, 140 A.D.2d 356, 527 N.Y.S.2d 845, 847-48 (1988) 
(willingness to aid in investigation demonstrated that 
polygraph not custodial). 
have considered himself free to leave at that time.11 Thus, 
we hold that, at least as of the time of Sheriff Hayward's 
questioning of defendant, defendant was subject to custodial 
interrogation and entitled to proper Miranda warnings. 
This case is similar to, and the result we reach 
consistent with, the Colorado case of People v. Alaien, 180 
Colo. 1, 501 P.2d 468 (1972) (en banc). In Alaien. the 
defendant, along with other individuals, was suspected of 
arson. 501 P.2d at 469. He voluntarily submitted to a 
polygraph examination. Iji. At no time was he advised of his 
Miranda rights. I£. at 470. Prior to the examination he was 
informed that the purpose of the test was to determine his 
involvement in the fire. I£. at 469-70. He was then asked 
questions concerning his guilt. !£. The exam was given three 
times and each time the test indicated his negative responses 
were not truthful. Id. at 470. At the conclusion of the test, 
he was confronted with the opinion that he was lying and, after 
discussing the matter, defendant confessed. Id. 
The trial court in Alaien found that once the officers 
concluded defendant was lying during the exam, the suspicion of 
guilt focused on him and the officers should have read him his 
Miranda rights. L£. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed with 
the trial court and held that Ma reasonable person would with 
logic conclude that he could not leave the premises of his own 
free will but would be detained for formal arrest.- I&. at 
471. Consequently, it affirmed the decision of the trial court 
to suppress defendant's confession. 
Other courts have applied an Alaien-type analysis to 
post-polygraph confessions. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 97 
N.J. 113, 477 A.2d 1265, 1269 (1984) ("When defendants are not 
advised of their Miranda rights, or do not properly waive them, 
confessions elicited after a polygraph test are typically 
suppressed.-); People v. Harris, 128 A.D.2d 891, 513 N.Y.S.2d 
817, 818 (1987) (mem.) (confession admissible because defendant 
appeared voluntarily for polygraph test and fully advised of 
rights before post-polygraph confession). The rationale of 
11. The state cites testimony to the effect that defendant did 
not consider himself under arrest even after he was formally 
arrested, suggesting this demonstrates that defendant could not 
have believed he was in custody when he first confessed. This 
evidence is at most a commentary on defendant's acumen. Under 
the objective "reasonable person- test, defendant's subjective 
belief about custody is not relevant. Berkemer v. McCartv. 468 
U.S. 420, 442 (1984). 
these polygraph cases comports with our view of custodial 
interrogation and thus we adopt their reasoning in this case. 
We need not decide whether defendant was in custody from 
the inception of the polygraph examination*2 because no 
confession was elicited until after the exam was completed and 
the sheriff summoned. It is sufficient to conclude that, Sgt. 
Elliot having determined defendant was lying in the exam, 
Miranda warnings were necessary before further questioning 
could properly proceed. 
It is clear from the record that defendant was not given 
Miranda warnings between the conclusion of the polygraph exam 
and the time he was formally arrested.13 Thus, unless we 
12. But see note 10, supra. It is interesting to note that 
the polygraph examiner considered Miranda warnings at the 
outset of the polygraph examination to be a necessity. He 
stated: "Because you are in the cop shop there is no doubt in 
your mind that this is the police station and/ uh, because you 
are in taking a polygraph from a law enforcement agency I must 
advise you of your rights . . . .H But see People v. Sohn, 148 
A.D.2d 553/ 539 N.Y.S.2d 29/ 31 (1989) (mem.) (giving of 
Miranda warnings was -apparently out of an 'excess of caution* 
[and did] not preclude a finding that [defendant] was not in 
custody"). 
Sergeant Elliot's approach/ whether or not legally 
required, surely seems prudent/ if for no other reason than 
that it forecloses the possibility a suspect will blurt out a 
confession after his deception has been ascertained but before 
Miranda warnings can be issued. Moreover/ as an arm of the 
state, the police have a responsibility to protect the 
constitutional rights of the citizenry, and erring on the side 
of giving the Miranda warnings before they are strictly 
required advances that function, as well as minimizes the risk 
that important evidence will be excluded because the warnings 
were not given early enough in the process. 
13. As indicated previously. Sheriff Hayward apparently relied 
upon Sgt. Elliot's claim that defendant had been properly 
"Mirandized" at the commencement of the polygraph exam. 
Although Sheriff Hayward, out of the same abundance of caution 
that may have motivated Sgt. Elliot, should ideally have given 
new Miranda warnings to defendant prior to interrogating him, 
the earlier warnings would have sufficed had Sgt. Elliot 
elicited a clear waiver of those rights from defendant at that 
time. £g£ State v. Martinez, 595 P.2d 897, 899-900 (Utah 1979) 
find that defendant's Miranda rights were adequately protected 
(Footnote 13 continued) 
(the law does not require repetition of Miranda rights within a 
short period of time and a continuous sequence of events even 
though defendant's status may actually change in the interim). 
The state did not argue that Sheriff Hayward's -good 
faith- reliance upon Sgt. Elliot's claim he previously issued 
Miranda warnings warranted an exception to the exclusionary 
rule. However, we note that, contrary to the trend in the 
Fourth Amendment area, courts have declined to create a -good 
faith- exception in the context of the Fifth Amendment. United 
States v. Scalf, 708 F.2d 1540, 1544 (10th Cir. 1983) (per 
curiam) ("once a suspect has invoked the right to counsel, 
knowledge of that request is imputed to all law enforcement 
officers who subsequently deal with the suspect-). See also 
Arizona v. Roberson, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 2101 (1988) (implicitly 
rejecting "good faith" argument); White v. Finkbeiner, 687 F.2d 
885, 887 n.9 (7th Cir. 1982) (declining to create exception 
absent clear indication from United States Supreme Court), 
vacated on other grounds, 465 U.S. 1075 (1984). 
An excellent treatment of a possible -good faith-
exception to the Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule is found in 
M. Gardner, The Emerging Good Faith Exception to the Miranda 
Rule—A Critigue, 35 Hastings L.J. 429 (1984). Professor 
Gardner concludes: 
While there may be reason to doubt the 
constitutional necessity of the fourth 
amendment exclusionary rule, the fifth 
amendment privilege is. itself a 
constitutionally required exclusionary 
rule. Whereas a fourth amendment 
violation occurs at the moment of the 
unlawful privacy violation, violations of 
the privilege against self-incrimination 
do not occur unless and until the 
government uses the tainted evidence 
against the defendant in a criminal 
proceeding. Although alternatives to the 
exclusionary rule might conceivably be 
developed to protect fourth amendment 
privacy interests, no alternative could 
possibly protect the fifth amendment 
values of maintaining an accusatorial 
system and respecting the dignity of 
by reason of the exchange at the outset of the polygraph 
examination undertaken by Sgt. Elliot,14 there was no 
adequate "Mirandizing" of defendant before he gave his 
custodial confession. We now examine whether defendant validly 
waived his Miranda rights at that time. 
WAIVER 
On appeal, defendant does not argue that the state failed 
to adequately inform him of his Miranda rights. Prior to the 
polygraph examination, Sgt. Elliot carefully informed defendant 
of each of his rights. Instead, defendant argues that he made 
an Hequivocal request- for counsel which the state failed to 
(Footnote 13 continued) 
criminal defendants. If use of compelled 
self-incriminating evidence is permitted, 
the fifth amendment's protection is 
destroyed. 
Id. at 462-63. 
14. We note that defendant was given a second set of Miranda 
warnings after he had informed Sheriff Hayward that his 
daughter was dead, gone with the police to American Fork to 
retrieve the body, been arrested, and been returned to Salt 
Lake City. Apparently recognizing that by that time all the 
damage had been done, the state does not argue the second set 
of Miranda warnings are of any consequence to our analysis. 
Defendant, on the other hand, argues that because he had 
previously invoked his right to counsel, albeit equivocally; 
had not been provided an attorney; and had not initiated any 
subsequent interrogation with the police, the fruits of the 
post-arrest interrogations must also be suppressed. We agree. 
In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), the United States 
Supreme Court held that once a defendant has invoked his right 
to counsel, statements made without counsel in subsequent 
interrogations initiated by the police, even when pursuant to 
renewed Miranda warnings, must be suppressed. Id. at 484-87. 
See also State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 237 (Utah 1985) (accused 
must initiate conversation). The rule in Edwards applies even 
more forcefully in a case such as this where the subsequent 
interrogation is prompted by, and designed to explain, 
information which has come to the police as a direct result of 
an earlier Miranda violation. 
clarify and, if appropriate, to honor. It is telling that the 
state does not address this issue on appeal, but instead puts 
all its eggs in the Nno custodial interrogation- basket. 
Nonetheless, because the state stops short of conceding the 
point and in view of its importance, we will address the issue 
in some detail. 
Initially we note that, though a defendant may waive his 
rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present during 
custodial interrogation, "these waivers must be both 
intentional and made with full knowledge of the consequences, 
and the defendant is given the benefit of every reasonable 
presumption against such a waiver." State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 
1208, 1211 (Utah 1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1044 (1988). 
See also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977). 
Consequently, the state has a heavy burden to establish both 
that a defendant understood his Miranda rights and that he 
voluntarily waived them. State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 443 
(Utah 1986). 
The state argued below, and the trial court found, that 
defendant's statement -Well, ah, should I have a lawyer, I 
mean, well, I'm really not worried about anything, it is just 
that . . .- did not qualify as even an equivocal request for 
counsel which the police had to be concerned about. We 
disagree. 
In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court stated: "If 
[defendant] indicates in any manner and at any stage of the 
process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before 
speaking there can be no questioning." 384 U.S. at 444-45 
(emphasis added). Thus, a defendant's "request for counsel may 
be ambiguous or equivocal,- Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 
(1984) (per curiam), and still qualify as an invocation of 
Mjranfla rights. 
This court dealt with an equivocal request for counsel in 
State v. Griffin. 754 P.2d 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In 
Griffin, the defendant stated during interrogation, "This is a 
lie. I'm calling an attorney." I£. at 966. We held that this 
statement "was arguably equivocal." Ifl. at 969. Defendant's 
statement in this case was less forceful than that in Griffin. 
However, other jurisdictions have found statements very similar 
to the one in this case to have constituted equivocal requests 
for counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Cherry, 733 F.2d 
1124, 1127 (5th Cir. 1984) ("Maybe I should talk to an attorney 
before I make a further statement.-), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 
1056 (1987); United States v. Fouche, 776 F.2d 1398, 1405 (9th 
Cir. 1985) (-might want to talk to a lawyer-), cert, denied. 
486 U.S. 1017 (1988); United States v. Prestiqiacomo, 504 F. 
Supp. 681, 683 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (mem.) (-maybe it would be good 
to have a lawyer-); Cheatham v. State, 719 P.2d 612, 618 (Wyo. 
1986) (after being asked if he wanted to talk, defendant 
responded -Well I don't care, I'd like to see a lawyer, too you 
know"); Hampel v. State, 706 P.2d 1173, 1176 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1985) (-I've got one question . . . [and the question is 
concerning a lawyer] . . . how would I be able to get one, a 
lawyer?-); People v. Russo, 148 Cal. App. 3d 1172, 196 Cal. 
Rptr. 466, 468 (1983) (WI don't know if I should have a lawyer 
here or what.-); State v. Moulds, 105 Idaho 880, 673 P.2d 1074, 
1083 (Ct. App. 1983) ("Maybe I need an attorney"); State v. 
Smith, 34 Wash. App. 405, 661 P.2d 1001, 1003 (1983) (MDo you 
think I need an attorney?-). See also United States v. Porter, 
764 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1985) (unsuccessful call to attorney's 
office in presence of officer treated as equivocal request for 
counsel), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1048 (1987); People v. Quirk, 
129 Cal. App. 3d 618, 181 Cal. Rptr. 301, 308 (1982) (inquiry 
by defendant as to whether wife had hired an attorney treated 
as equivocal request for counsel). We hold that defendant's 
statement in this case was of a caliber similar to those just 
quoted, and like them, constituted an equivocal request for 
counsel.15 See also Comment, Equivocal Requests for 
Counsel: A Balance of Competing Policy Considerations, 55 
Cine. L. Rev. 767, 770-71 (1987) [hereinafter -The Cincinnati 
Comment-] (categorizing recurring types of equivocal requests 
for counsel, including as one category -[i]ndecisive statements 
that indicate uncertainty in the suspect's mind about the need 
or advisability of obtaining legal representation-). 
Courts have developed different standards to handle 
equivocal requests for counsel. The United States Supreme 
Court identified three methods for handling equivocal requests 
in Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95-96 & n.3 (1984), but 
declined to identify any of them as the constitutionally 
correct one. 
Some courts have held that all 
questioning must cease upon any request 
15. -Equivocal request- appears to be an imprecise term in 
this context. Many of the references to attorneys which are 
held to be equivocal requests for counsel are not requests at 
all. It may be preferable to refer to such statements as 
-equivocal references to an attorney." See, e.g., Note, The 
Right to Counsel Purina Custodial Interrogation: Equivocal 
References to an Attorney, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 1159 (1986) 
[hereinafter -The Vanderbilt Note-]. 
for or reference to counsel, however 
equivocal or ambiguous. . . . Others have 
attempted to define a threshold standard 
of clarity for such requests, and have 
held that requests falling below this 
threshold do not trigger the right to 
counsel. . . . Still others have adopted 
a third approach, holding that when an 
accused makes an equivocal statement that 
-arguably- can be construed as a request 
for counsel, all interrogation must 
immediately cease except for narrow 
questions designed to -clarify" the 
earlier statement and the accused's 
desires respecting counsel. 
Id. at 96 n.3 (emphasis added). In Griffin, this court adopted 
the third approach, holding -that when an accused makes an 
arguably equivocal request for counsel during custodial 
interrogation, further questioning must be limited to 
clarifying the request.- 754 P.2d at 969. We remain convinced 
that this middle approach16 is preferable to either of the 
two more extreme positions and note that it is regarded as the 
majority view. Note, Judicial Approaches to the Ambiguous 
Reguest for Counsel, 62 Notre Dame L. Rev. 460, 472 (1987) 
[hereinafter -The Notre Dame Note"]. It is also favored by 
commentators as the approach which best balances the interests 
of law enforcement and the rights of the accused. See, e.g., 
Note, The Right to Counsel During Custodial Interrogation: 
Equivocal References to an Attorney, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 1159, 
1187-94 (1986); The Notre Dame Note at 472-73; The Cincinnati 
Comment at 783. 
Unfortunately, neither Sgt. Elliot nor Sheriff Hayward 
attempted to clarify defendant's equivocal reference to an 
attorney. The transcript of the polygraph examination—and the 
actual tape is not part of our record—indicates a pause 
following defendant's equivocal statements about counsel after 
which Sgt. Elliot stated "Okay, if you are not worried about 
anything I would say that is fine, let's go ahead and 
proceed.- Nothing in this statement by Sgt. Elliot nor any 
subsequent statement amounts to an effort to clarify 
defendant's request. Although, as indicated previously, the 
state did not see fit to brief the -equivocal request for 
counsel- issues on appeal, it argued below that defendant's 
16. See The Vanderbilt Note at 1187 (clarification approach 
represents Ha middle position"). 
subsequent statement that he was -willing to get it over with" 
was sufficient to clarify his position and to demonstrate a 
waiver of his right to counsel.17 We disagree. 
17. The state also argued below that defendant's signing the 
written waiver form, on the heels of his "willing to get it 
over with" comment, clarified that his position was to waive 
his right to counsel. At least one court has accepted this 
argument. See State v. Smith, 34 Wash. App. 405, 661 P.2d 
1001, 1003 (1983). In Smith, the defendant signed a waiver 
form subsequent to his equivocal reference to counsel and then 
proceeded to speak with the officers. Our Washington 
counterpart found those facts sufficient to demonstrate a 
waiver on the part of the defendant. 
We decline to adopt the Washington position for three 
reasons. First, we find the position inconsistent with the 
presumption against waiver. See State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 
1208, 1211 (Utah 1987). Second, we have already noted that 
once a defendant invokes his right to counsel, statements made 
in subsequent interrogations, without counsel present and even 
if pursuant to renewed warnings, must also be suppressed unless 
defendant initiates the contact. See note 14, supra. If 
police cannot circumvent the rule through renewed Miranda 
warnings days after a request for counsel, we see no reason to 
allow them to do so through a simple waiver form given on the 
heels of the equivocal reference without any clarification. 
Finally, other courts have not found a waiver where the 
defendant has signed a waiver form immediately after an 
unclarified, equivocal reference to counsel. See, e.g., United 
States v. Prestiaiacomo. 504 F. Supp. 681, 682-84 (E.D.N.Y. 
1981) (mem.). ££. United States v. Fouche, 776 F.2d 1398, 1405 
(9th Cir. 1985) (M[T]he police may not use a statement a 
suspect makes after an equivocal request for counsel, but 
before the request is clarified, as an effective waiver of the 
right to counsel.-). Especially in this case, that approach 
makes sense. Once defendant made an equivocal reference to 
counsel, as explained in the text Sgt. Elliot could properly do 
only one thing—seek clarification. Instead, he concluded that 
defendant was -not worried," that they should -proceed . . . 
and get it over with . . . .,- and he submitted the written 
form to defendant for signature. In effect, submission of the 
written form to defendant was an integral part of Sgt. Elliot's 
conduct which was at odds with his duty to clarify and as such, 
the written form cannot be taken as clarifying defendant's 
equivocal request. 
This case is similar to United States v. Prestiqiacomo, 
504 F. Supp. 681 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (mem.), and State v. Moulds, 
105 Idaho 880, 673 P.2d 1074 (Ct. App. 1983), which were 
favorably cited by this court in Griffin. In Prestiqiacomo. 
the interrogator did not clarify the defendant's equivocal 
request for counsel. 504 F. Supp. at 682. Instead, he asked 
defendant whether he would continue to answer questions. L£. 
After receiving an affirmative response, he proceeded to 
interrogate him. III. The court in that case found the 
interrogator had given Hthe impression that what defendant said 
would not be treated as a sign, albeit an equivocal one, that 
he wished a lawyer.- IdL at 684. That tactic was improper 
and, consequently, the court suppressed the statements which 
resulted from further interrogation. I£. 
In Moulds, the defendant made an equivocal request for 
counsel. 673 P.2d at 1083. Instead of clarifying the request, 
the interrogator recognized defendant's right, informed 
defendant that the decision was his to make, and then proceeded 
to discuss the case with defendant. Icl. Thereafter, the 
defendant made incriminating remarks. !£. The Idaho court 
found that defendant's "statements were the products of 
interrogation continued at the instance of the police after the 
right to counsel had been invoked.- Ifl. at 1085. 
Consequently, the court affirmed the suppression of the 
statements. i£. 
The fatal flaw in both Prestiqiacomo and Moulds was the 
failure to cease interrogation except for the very limited 
purpose of clarifying whether defendant wished to assert his 
right to counsel. The fact that defendant continued to answer 
questions was not a sufficient indication that he was 
abandoning his right to counsel. In contrast, Griffin serves 
as an example of a valid waiver of Miranda rights following 
clarification of an ambiguous reference to counsel. In 
Griffin, defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, which he 
waived. 754 P.2d at 966. However, during the ensuing 
interview there came a time when he said, -I'm calling an 
attorney." Id. The interrogating officer immediately asked, 
"OK, are you saying you don't want to talk anymore?M1° Id. 
18. The main problem inherent in the clarification approach is 
-the additional opportunity given to law enforcement officials 
to . . . [use] clarifying questions to dissuade- suspects from 
asserting their right to counsel. The Notre Dame Note at 472. 
See Anderson v. Smith, 751 F.2d 96, 104 n.9 (2nd Cir. 1984); 
Daniel v. State. 644 P.2d 172, 177 (Wyo. 1982) (permissible for 
officer to -seek clarification of the suspect's desires, as 
at 966-67. Defendant's response indicated he would continue to 
talk to the detective at that time, but planned to talk to an 
attorney later. I&. at 967. Thus, although the conviction in 
Griffin was reversed on other grounds, further interrogation 
following the clarifying exchange just described was held not 
violative of defendant's Miranda rights. 
Defendant's statement in this case included a reference to 
an attorney which is properly classed as an equivocal request 
for counsel. Because Sgt. Elliot's warnings were the only 
Miranda warnings which defendant received before undergoing 
custodial interrogation, it was necessary that someone clarify 
that equivocal request before defendant could be subjected to 
custodial interrogation. Defendant's request was never 
clarified and, consequently, the state failed to demonstrate a 
valid waiver of defendant's right to counsel. The trial court 
erred in holding to the contrary. We accordingly reverse and 
remand for a new trial. 
Because the trial court concluded that defendant's Miranda 
rights had not been violated, the parties did not have occasion 
to argue which evidence had to be excluded and whether any 
(Footnote 18 continued) 
long as he does not disguise the clarification as a subterfuge 
for coercion or intimidation"). See also Thompson v. 
WainwriQht, 601 F.2d 768, 771-72 (5th Cir. 1979) (during 
purported effort to clarify, officer asserted that obtaining 
counsel may not be in defendant's best interest); Hampel v. 
State, 706 P.2d 1173, 1182 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (during 
purported effort to clarify, officer emphasized delay and 
complexity of obtaining an attorney). 
One commentator has suggested that only one question 
should be permitted to seek clarification. With our 
embellishment in the form of an introductory statement, that 
question is as follows: You have been advised of your rights, 
including the right to have an attorney with you during this 
interview even if you cannot afford to hire one. What you just 
said leads me to wonder whether or not you wish to avail 
yourself of that right. "Do you want the assistance of [an 
attorney] at this time or do you agree to answer questions 
without the presence of [an attorney]?" Comment, Equivocal 
Requests for Counsel: A Balance of Competing Policy 
Considerations, 55 Cine. L. Rev. 767, 782 (1987). 
exceptions to the exclusionary rule might apply.19 On 
remand, the parties must of course be allowed to argue these 
various points. After entertaining these arguments, the trial 
court must exclude all primary evidence elicited during the 
custodial interrogation and all incriminating evidence derived 
therefrom which is not saved by an exception to the 
exclusionary rule. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 
(1966); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 441 (1984). 
Our decision is a difficult one and will be a source of 
consternation to many, who will question why the state should 
be put to the cost and burden of having to retry someone who 
clearly is guilty. But while the results in particular cases 
19. The "independent source doctrine" and -inevitable 
discovery ruleH are among the exceptions to the exclusionary 
rule. Sg£ State v. Northrup. 756 P.2d 1288, 1292-94 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). The state had no occasion to argue either 
exception, on appeal or below. Consequently, we are unable to 
determine whether either of these exceptions might apply in 
this case to some of the evidence which might otherwise have to 
be suppressed. 
"The independent source doctrine allows admission of 
evidence that has been discovered by means wholly independent 
of any constitutional violation.- Nix v. Williams. 467 U.S. 
431, 443 (1984). Thus, any evidence which was discovered apart 
from defendant's statements made during custodial interrogation 
need not be excluded. 
The inevitable discovery rule allows the admission of 
evidence as long as Hthe prosecution can establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately 
or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.- Id. 
at 444. Sfifi/ M M People v. Freeman. 739 P.2d 856, 860 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1987) (body of deceased victim was so conspicuously 
located that discovery was inevitable); State v. Miller. 300 
Or. 203, 709 P.2d 225, 242-43 (1985) (hotel maid would 
inevitably have discovered body of deceased victim within 56 
hours of actual discovery and reported discovery to police), 
cert, denied. 475 U.S. 1141 (1986). Under this rule, the 
prosecution must show that the evidence HwouldH have been 
discovered, not simply that it -could- or -might- have been 
discovered. Miller. 709 P.2d at 242. See also United States 
v. Romero. 692 F.2d 699, 704 (10th Cir. 1982). It is 
altogether unclear from the record before us how much, if any, 
of the evidence discovered as a result of the improper 
custodial interrogation would inevitably have been discovered. 
may be unwelcome, w[t]he fifth amendment exclusionary rule is 
clearly dictated by the Constitution and is the only possible 
means of protecting the values underlying the privilege against 
self-incrimination." M. Gardner, The Emerging Good Faith 
Exception to the Miranda Rule—A Critigue, 35 Hastings L.J. 429, 
466 (1984). We accordingly reverse and remand for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
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This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted, and the 
Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is now 
ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the district 
court herein be, and the same is, reversed and remanded for 
further proceedings in accordance with the views expressed in 
the opinion filed herein. 
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